Striking seamen who brought most of Britain’s ports to a halt forced the Government into an extreme step on May 23rd, 1966.
It declared a ‘state of emergency’ – a last resort measure which granted powers to move in and get trade flowing again if the situation worsened. It was a desperate measure for any Government, but even more so for a Labour one, headed by Prime Minister Harold Wilson.
The strike had been called a week earlier by the National Union of Seamen (NUS), campaigning for better pay and conditions for its members. It wanted improved rates of pay and a reduced working week from 56 hours to 40, in line with much of the rest of British industry. Any hours worked over the basic 40 would have to be paid as ‘overtime’, at an increased rate.
The Government had been trying to keep wage rises below 3.5% and giving in to the seamen would set a dangerous precedent, but the strike was causing serious problems. Major ports, especially London, Liverpool and Southampton, soon became clogged, their berths occupied by ships abandoned by their striking crews.
Other vessels arriving at affected ports were unable to dock, while some foreign ships which had been in port when the strike began found themselves unable to leave. Trade was significantly disrupted, threatening Britain’s relations with foreign trading partners and provoking a run on the pound. Supplies of imported goods began to dry up, affecting British manufacturers and suppliers.
Some foodstuffs became scarce on supermarket shelves and prices began to rise, while other industries which relied on trade through Britain’s ports, such as hauliers, also felt a knock-on effect. Efforts to resolve the dispute around the negotiating table made slow progress in the first week. The Government acknowledged that working conditions for seamen needed to be modernised and promised an inquiry, but refused to meet the union’s demands in full.
It said that doing so would result in massive overtime payments which would contradict its national policies on limiting wage rises to reduce inflation. When the Prime Minister announced he was imposing a national state of emergency due to the strike, it marked a downturn in negotiations.
The rarely-used measure gave the Government powers to mobilise its own manpower to break the strike if necessary. In particular, the Royal Navy could be used to clear blocked ports and take control of them, while other Government forces and vehicles would be used to get goods moving again. Announcing the measure in the House of Commons, Mr Wilson promised the emergency powers would not be used until deemed absolutely necessary, but insisted they had to be in place.
He told fellow MPs: “The Government must protect the vital interests of the nation. This is not action against the National Union of Seamen.”
Ship owners were also putting pressure on the Government to act. Export goods worth up to £40m. had been halted by the strike. Most would just be delayed, but some perishable goods would have to be written off. Passenger ships were also severely affected, with most of Cunard’s fleet out of action and the company forced to compensate angry and disappointed travellers. A week into the strike all 900 crew members of Cunard’s flagship the Queen Mary walked off the ship after it docked at Southampton at the end of its voyage from New York.
Almost a week later, on May 28th, Mr Wilson made another statement claiming that hardline Communists were trying to use the strike to take control of the NUS. He accused them of “endangering the security of the industry and the economic welfare of the nation”, which many took as a hint that he was on the brink of implementing emergency powers.
The following day the seamen voted to return to work, partly due to his comments but also because progress had been made towards reaching a pay compromise with ship owners. Negotiations continued, with the threat of further strike action meaning the state of emergency remained in place until the two sides finally reached agreement on July 1st.
It had been a major test for Wilson, whose hardline tactics angered many on the left of the Labour Party. They recognised that the powerful trade unions were the source of their party’s power and the bulk of its revenue.